Ricardo Santos, “Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability and the Knower Paradox: Against a Proposed Dialetheist Unified Solution,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 73, no. 3–4 (2017): 1001–20, DOI 10.17990/RPF/2017_73_3_1001.
| Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Ricardo Santos |
| Rights | © 2018 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural | © 2018 Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| Volume | 73 |
| Issue | 3-4 |
| Pages | 1001-1020 |
| Publication | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| ISSN | 0870-5283; 2183-461X |
| Date | 2017 |
| DOI | 10.17990/RPF/2017_73_3_1001 |
| Language | English |
| Abstract | After introducing Fitch’s paradox of knowability and the knower paradox, the paper critically discusses the dialetheist unified solution to both problems that Beall and Priest have proposed. It is first argued that the dialetheist approach to the knower paradox can withstand the main objections against it, these being that the approach entails an understanding of negation that is intolerably weak (allowing one to stay in agreement with something that one negates) and that it commits dialetheists to jointly accept and reject the same thing. The lesson of the knower paradox, according to dialetheism, is that human knowledge is inconsistent. The paper also argues that this inconsistency has not been shown by dialetheists to be wide enough in its scope to justify their approach to Fitch’s problem. The connection between the two problems is superficial and therefore the proposed unified solution fails. |
| Date Added | 17/01/2018, 17:50:02 |
| Modified | 17/01/2018, 19:23:35 |
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