Gehad Marcon Bark, “Percepção como Representação Conceitual: Uma Proposta para a Compreensão do Enativismo de Alva Noë a partir da Tese Kantiana da Complementaridade,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 72, no. 2–3 (2016): 661–96, DOI 10.17990/RPF/2016_72_2_0661.
| Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Gehad Marcon Bark |
| Rights | © 2016 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural | © 2016 Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| Volume | 72 |
| Issue | 2-3 |
| Pages | 661-696 |
| Publication | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| ISSN | 0870-5283; 2183-461X |
| Date | 2016 |
| DOI | 10.17990/RPF/2016_72_2_0661 |
| Language | Portuguese |
| Abstract | In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant says that human cognition is possible only through the unification of intuition and concept – what has been called “the togetherness principle”. Taking intuition and concept as complementary one to each other, some tend to see Kant as committed to the thesis that cognition, as objective representation with consciousness, would require more than the affection of the knowing subject. This paper tries to sketch possible ways to relate the togetherness principle to the enactivism of Alva Noë in Action in Perception. The enactivism is an approach from cognitive science and, as proposed by Noë, it suggests that perception is not something that happens to one or with one, but something that one does. According to Noë, perception requires bodily skills and a practical understanding concerning the way these skills coordinate with sensory stimulation: one must be able to know how to use these skills in order to perceive real properties. Since cognition involves intentionality, it also requires an active capacity by which the object will be represented with the generality of concepts, therefore suggesting a closer relation between Kant’s togetherness principle and Noë’s enactivism. |
| Date Added | 19/10/2016, 12:26:54 |
| Modified | 25/10/2016, 10:23:25 |
Allison, Henry E. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: an Interpretation and Defense. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004.
Burge, Tyler. Origins of objectivity. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Falkenbach, Tiago Fonseca. Objetividade e espacialidade: Kant e a refutação do idealismo. 12.07.12. 255 páginas. Tese. Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, 2012.
Kant, Immanuel. Crítica da Razão Prática. Tradução de Valerio Rohden. 2. ed. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2008.
Kant, Immanuel. Crítica da Razão Pura. Traduzido de Alexandre Fradique Morujão e Manuela Pinto dos Santos. 7. ed. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 2010.
Kant, Immanuel. Crítica da Razão Pura. Traduzido por Valerio Rohden e Udo Baldur Moosburger. 2. ed. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1983.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Traduzido por P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Noë, Alva. Action in perception. Cambridge: The Mit Press, 2004.
Russell, Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy. London: The Oxford University Press, 1951.
Sheya, Adam e Smith, Linda B. “Development through Sensorimotor Coordination”. In Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science, editado por John Stewart, Olivier Gappene e Ezequiel e A. Di Paolo, 120-143. Cambridge: The Harvard University Press, 2010.
Stewart, John. “Foundational Issues in Enaction as a Paradigm for Cognitive Science”. In Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science, editado por John Stewart, Olivier Gappene e Ezequiel e A. Di Paolo, 1-31. Cambridge: The Harvard University Press, 2010.
Thompson, Evan T. Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind. Cambridge: The Harvard University Press, 2007.
Varela, Francisco J., Thompson, Evan T., Rosch, Eleanor. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge: The Mit Press, 1991.
