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Intentionalism and the Problem of the Content of Perception

Intentionalism and the Problem of the Content of Perception

Karla Chediak, “Intentionalism and the Problem of the Content of Perception,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 72, no. 2–3 (2016): 519–30, DOI 10.17990/RPF/2016_72_2_0519.

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Intentionalism and the Problem of the Content of Perception

  • Type Journal Article
    Author Karla Chediak
    Rights © 2016 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural | © 2016 Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
    Volume 72
    Issue 2-3
    Pages 519-530
    Publication Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
    ISSN 0870-5283; 2183-461X
    Date 2016
    DOI 10.17990/RPF/2016_72_2_0519
    Language English
    Abstract In this paper I will discuss the intentionalist view of perception, and present some arguments to support the view that, contrary to Michael Martin’s criticism, intentionalists do not need to conceive the content of perception as either singular or general, because this is not the way that it should be thought. The right way to conceive the representational content of perception is by considering it as informational and functional.
    Date Added 19/10/2016, 12:26:44
    Modified 25/10/2016, 10:11:17

    Keywords:

    • common factor principle,
    • disjunctivism,
    • hallucination,
    • intentionalism,
    • perception,
    • singular content

    References:

    • Byrne, Alex and Logue, Heather. Disjunctivism. Contemporary Readings. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009. 
      Chediak, Karla. “Funções e explicações funcionais em biologia”. In Filosofia da Biologia, edited by Paulo Abrantes, 83-96. Porto Alegre: Artmed, 2011.
      Chediak, Karla. “The etiological approach to the concept of biological function”. In Brazilian Studies in Philosophy and History of Science, edited by Décio Krause and Antonio Augusto Passos Videira, 161-169.  New York: Springer, 2011.
      Crane, Tim. “Intentionalism”. In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, edited by Ansgar Beckermann, Brian McLaughlin and Sven Walter, 474-493. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009.
      Crane, Tim. “Is there a perceptual relation?”. In Perceptual Experience, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthome, 126-146. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006.
      Crane, Tim. “The nonconceptual content of experience”. In The Contents of Experience. edited by Tim Crane, 136-157. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
      Davies, Martin. “Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 (1991): 21-45.
      Fish, William. “The direct/indirect distinction in contemporary philosophy of perception”. Essays in Philosophy 5, n. 1, (2004):1-13.
      Jackson, Frank. “Michael Tye on perceptual content”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84, n.1 (2012): 199-205.
      Martin, Michael. “Particular thoughts & singular thought”. In Logic, Thought and Language, edited by Anthony O’Hear, 173-214. Cambridge: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 2002.
      Martin, Michael. “The transparence of experience”. Mind and Language 17, n. 4 (2002): 376-425.
      Tye, Michael. “Reply to Crane, Jackson and McLaughlin”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84, n.1 (2012):  215-232. 
      Tye, Michael. “The limits of self-awareness”. Philosophical Studies 120 (2004): 37-89.
      Tye, Michael. “Transparency, Qualia Realism and Representationalism”. Philosophical Studies 170 (2014): 39-57.

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