|Rights||© 2018 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural | © 2018 Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia|
|Publication||Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia|
|Abstract||This paper is devoted to the topic of indexicality in relation to the problem of cognitive significance. I undertake a critical examination of what I call the Millian Notational Variance Claim; this is the claim that those versions of a neo-Fregean semantics for demonstratives and other indexicals which rest upon the notion of a de re sense are eventually notational variants of a directly referential or Millian semantics for indexicals. I try to show that several lines of reasoning that might be pursued by Millian theorists with a view to establishing the Millian Notational Variance Claim are inconclusive, and hence that the claim is in general unsound. The problem of cognitive significance is tackled in connection with those categories of indexicals concerning which neo-Fregeanism and Millianism are alleged to yield similar results, viz. temporal indexicals, spatial indexicals, and perceptual demonstratives. I argue towards the conclusion that the notions the Millian theorist might invoke to accommodate the phenomena of cognitive significance in this area of indexicality are hardly adequate to the effect, and hence that senses are indispensable also here.|
|Date Added||17/01/2018, 17:51:20|
Branquinho, João. “On the Individuation of Fregean Propositions”. In Analytic Philosophy and Logic. The Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy, Vol. VI, edited by A. Kanamori, 17-28. Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000.
Branquinho, João. “Are Salmon’s ‘Guises’ Disguised Fregean Senses”. Analysis 50 (1990): 19-24.
Branquinho, João. ‘On the persistence and re-expression of indexical belief’. Manuscrito 31, no. 2 (2008): 573-600.
Campbell, John. “Is Sense Transparent?”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (1987/88): 273-92.
Evans, Gareth. “Understanding Demonstratives”. In Meaning and Understanding, edited by Herman Parret and Jacques. Bouveresse. Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1981. Reprinted in Gareth Evans, Collected Papers, 291-321. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1985.
Evans, Gareth. The Varieties of Reference, edited by John McDowell. Oxford: Clarendon Press and New York: Oxford University Press. 1982.
Forbes, Graeme. “Indexicals and Intensionality: A Fregean Perspective”. The Philosophical Review 96, no. 1 (1987): 3-31.
Forbes, Graeme. “Indexicals”. In Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume IV, edited by D.Gabbay and F.Guenthner, 463-90. Dordrecht: David Reidel, 1989.
Frege, Gottlob. “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry”. Translated by Anthony and Marcelle Quinton. In Philosophical Logic, edited by Peter F. Strawson, 17-38. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.
McDowell, John. “De Re senses”. The Philosophical Quarterly 34, no. 136 (1974): 98-109.
McGinn, Colin. The Subjective View. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.
Mertel, Kurt C.M. “Re-Thinking Gareth Evans’ Approach to Indexical Sense and the Problem of Tracking Thoughts”. Grazer Philosophische Studien 94, Issue 1-2 (2017): 173–193. DOI: 10.1163/18756735-000013
Peacocke, Christopher A.B. Sense and Content. Experience, Thought and their Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.
Peacocke, Christopher A.B. Thoughts: An Essay on Content. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
Récanati, François. Mental Files in Flux. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
Salmon, Nathan. Frege’s Puzzle. Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: The MIT Press, 1986.
Salmon, Nathan. “Illogical Belief”. In Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory. Edited by James E.Tomberlin, 243-285. Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1989.
Salmon, Nathan. “A Millian heir rejects the wages of Sinn”. In Propositional Attitudes: the Role of Content in Logic, Language and Mind, edited by C.A. Anderson and J. Owens, 215-48. Stanford: CSLI, 1990.
Schiffer, S. “The Mode-of-Presentation Problem”. In Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language and Mind, edited by C.A. Anderson and J. Owens, 249-68. Stanford: CSLI, 1990.
Searle, John. Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Soames, Scott. “Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content”. Philosophical Topics 15 (1987): 47-87. Reprinted in Propositions and Attitudes, edited by Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames, 197-239. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
Soames, Scott. “Substitutivity”. In On Being and Saying: Essays for Richard Cartwright, edited by J.J. Thomson, 99-132. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Soames, Scott. “Review of Gareth Evans, Collected Papers”. The Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989): 141-56.
Total 0,00 €