Problemas para a Explicação Matemática
Eduardo Castro, “Problemas para a Explicação Matemática,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 73, no. 3–4 (2017): 1437–62, DOI 10.17990/RPF/2017_73_3_1437.
Eduardo Castro, “Problemas para a Explicação Matemática,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 73, no. 3–4 (2017): 1437–62, DOI 10.17990/RPF/2017_73_3_1437.
Type | Journal Article |
---|---|
Author | Eduardo Castro |
Rights | © 2018 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural | © 2018 Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
Volume | 73 |
Issue | 3-4 |
Pages | 1437-1462 |
Publication | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
ISSN | 0870-5283; 2183-461X |
Date | 2017 |
DOI | 10.17990/RPF/2017_73_3_1437 |
Language | Portuguese |
Abstract | Mathematical proofs aim to establish the truth of mathematical propositions by means of logical rules. Some recent literature in philosophy of mathematics alleges that some mathematical proofs also reveal why the proved mathematical propositions are true. These mathematical proofs are called explanatory mathematical proofs. In this paper, I present and discuss some salient problems around mathematical explanation: the existence problem, the normative problem, the explanandum problems of truth value and psychological value, the logical structure problem, the regress problem and the modelling problem. At the end, I sum up two contemporary models for mathematical explanation – the deductive-nomological model and the model of Steiner. I analyse these models against the previous problems. |
Date Added | 17/01/2018, 17:51:14 |
Modified | 18/01/2018, 10:41:58 |
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