Domingos Faria, “(β) não dá Base ao Incompatibilismo entre Determinismo e Livre-Arbítrio,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 75, no. 3 (2019): 1951–76, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2019_75_3_1951.
| Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Domingos Faria |
| Rights | © 2019 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural | © 2019 Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| Volume | 75 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 1951-1976 |
| Publication | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| ISSN | 0870-5283 |
| Date | 2019 |
| DOI | 10.17990/RPF/2019_75_3_1951 |
| Language | Portuguese |
| Abstract | Our aim in this paper is to critically assess Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. This argument is sound only if rule (β) is valid. We present reasons to reject or to be skeptical of the rule (β) and similar rules. So, the consequence argument is not a sound argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. |
| Date Added | 27/10/2019, 19:53:23 |
| Modified | 27/10/2019, 21:09:41 |
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