Vanessa Triviño and María Cerezo, “The metaphysical equivalence between 3D and 4D theories of species,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71, no. 4 (2015): 781–806, DOI 10.17990/rpf/2015_71_4_0781.
| Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Vanessa Triviño |
| Author | María Cerezo |
| Rights | © 2015 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural | © 2015 Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| Volume | 71 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 781-806 |
| Publication | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| ISSN | 0870-5283; 2183-461X |
| Date | 2015 |
| DOI | 10.17990/rpf/2015_71_4_0781 |
| Language | Spanish |
| Abstract |
Resumo: Neste artigo revemos um debate recente na metafísica da evolução, que tanto diz respeito à persistência e à “mudança” – nas espécies biológicas –, como à tese que considera a “espécie-como-indivíduos”. Centramo-nos na proposta de Thomas Reydon de que o termo “espécie”, na biologia, se refere a duas entidades biológicas distintas, por ele denominadas de “evolverons” e “phylons”, desempenhando vários papéis epistemológicos em pelo menos duas disciplinas diferentes, nomeadamente, na biologia sistemática e na biologia evolutiva. Em particular, revemos criticamente a afirmação de Reydon de que estas duas entidades biológicas geram um problema para a tese que sustém a equivalência entre as duas teorias de persistência, desenvolvidas na metafísica analítica contemporânea: o triDimensionalismo (3D) e tetraDimensionalismo (4D). Neste artigo, pretendemos restaurar a tese da equivalência metafísica, através de uma tripla estratégia: promover a ideia de que os “evolverons” e os “phylons” são duas dimensões de uma mesma entidade; utilizar uma noção menos problemática de endurantismo (persistência 3D) e; por último, explorar algumas dúvidas surgidas com exemplos particulares da biologia que Reydon utiliza para fundar os seus argumentos. |
| Date Added | 28/07/2015, 12:02:41 |
| Modified | 10/12/2015, 15:33:22 |
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