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The metaphysical equivalence between 3D and 4D theories of species

The metaphysical equivalence between 3D and 4D theories of species

Vanessa Triviño and María Cerezo, “The metaphysical equivalence between 3D and 4D theories of species,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71, no. 4 (2015): 781–806, DOI 10.17990/rpf/2015_71_4_0781.

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  • The metaphysical equivalence between 3D and 4D theories of species

    Type Journal Article
    Author Vanessa Triviño
    Author María Cerezo
    Rights © 2015 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural | © 2015 Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
    Volume 71
    Issue 4
    Pages 781-806
    Publication Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
    ISSN 0870-5283; 2183-461X
    Date 2015
    DOI 10.17990/rpf/2015_71_4_0781
    Language Spanish
    Abstract

    Resumo: Neste artigo revemos um debate recente na metafísica da evolução, que tanto diz respeito à persistência e à “mudança” – nas espécies biológicas –, como à tese que considera a “espécie-como-indivíduos”. Centramo-nos na proposta de Thomas Reydon de que o termo “espécie”, na biologia, se refere a duas entidades biológicas distintas, por ele denominadas de “evolverons” e “phylons”, desempenhando vários papéis epistemológicos em pelo menos duas disciplinas diferentes, nomeadamente, na biologia sistemática e na biologia evolutiva. Em particular, revemos criticamente a afirmação de Reydon de que estas duas entidades biológicas geram um problema para a tese que sustém a equivalência entre as duas teorias de persistência, desenvolvidas na metafísica analítica contemporânea: o triDimensionalismo (3D) e tetraDimensionalismo (4D). Neste artigo, pretendemos restaurar a tese da equivalência metafísica, através de uma tripla estratégia: promover a ideia de que os “evolverons” e os “phylons” são duas dimensões de uma mesma entidade; utilizar uma noção menos problemática de endurantismo (persistência 3D) e; por último, explorar algumas dúvidas surgidas com exemplos particulares da biologia que Reydon utiliza para fundar os seus argumentos. 

    Palavras-chave: conceito de espécie, endurantismo, equivalência metafísica entre 3D e 4D, espécies biológicas sincrónicas e diacrónicas, persistência 

    Abstract: In this paper we revise a recent debate on the metaphysics of evolution pertaining to both the persistence and change of biological species, and the species-as-individuals thesis. We focus on Thomas Reydon’s proposal that, in biology, the term “species” refers to two different biological entities, which he calls evolverons and phylons, and plays different epistemological roles in at least two different disciplines in which it is used, namely, evolutionary and systematic biology. In particular, we critically revise Reydon’s claim that these two biological entities raise a problem for the thesis of the equivalence between the two theories of persistence developed in contemporary analytic metaphysics: three–dimensionalism (3D) and four–dimensionalism (4D). In this paper, we aim to reinstate the thesis of metaphysical equivalence by a threefold strategy: motivation of the idea that evolverons and phylons are two dimensions of the same entity, shifting to a less problematic notion of endurance (3D persistence), and an exploration of doubts about the particular biological examples upon which Reydon bases his arguments. 

    Keywords: 3D / 4D metaphysical equivalence, endurantism, persistence, species concept, synchronic and diachronic biological species

    Date Added 28/07/2015, 12:02:41
    Modified 10/12/2015, 15:33:22

    Tags:

    • 3D/4D metaphysical equivalence
    • endurance
    • Persistence
    • species concept
    • synchronic and diachronic biological species

    Notes:

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