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Some Remarks on Backwards Causation

Some Remarks on Backwards Causation

Brian Garrett, “Some Remarks on Backwards Causation,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71, no. 4 (2015): 695–704, DOI 10.17990/rpf/2015_71_4_0695.

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Type Journal Article
Author Brian Garrett
Rights © 2015 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural | © 2015 Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
Volume 71
Issue 4
Pages 695-704
Publication Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
ISSN 0870-5283; 2183-461X
Date 2015
DOI 10.17990/rpf/2015_71_4_0695
Language English
Abstract

Resumo: Neste texto, o autor centra-se em dois artigos clássicos – o de Max Black “Why cannot an effect precede its cause”? (1956) e o de Michael Dummett “Bringing about the Past” (1964) –, para argumentar que o “bilking argument” de Black, contra a possibilidade da causalidade invertida, falha o seu objectivo. Apesar de o autor concordar com Dummett, na possibilidade de um agente actuar no presente para que algo aconteça no passado, discorda da resposta dada por este último a um desafio céptico que lhe foi lançado, para mostrar a inutilidade de se alterar o passado. 

Palavras-chave: Black, causalidade invertida, Dummett, razões, tempo 

Abstract: In this discussion I focus on two classic articles: Max Black’s ‘Why cannot an effect precede its cause?’ (1956) and Michael Dummett’s ‘Bringing about the Past’ (1964). I argue that Black’s bilking argument against the possibility of backwards causation fails. I agree with Dummett that the idea of an agent acting in order that something should have happened in the past is not absurd, but I disagree with Dummett’s response to a sceptical challenge which attempts to show that it is pointless to attempt to affect the past. 

Keywords: backwards causation, Black, Dummett, reasons, time

Date Added 28/07/2015, 12:02:55
Modified 10/12/2015, 15:22:24

Tags:

  • backwards causation
  • Black
  • Dummett
  • reasons
  • time

Notes:

  • Ben-Yami, H. “The Impossibility of Backwards Causation.” Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2007): 439–55.

     

    -         “Backwards Causation Still Impossible.” Analysis 70.1 (2010): 89–92.

     

    Black, M. “Why Cannot an Effect Precede Its Cause?” Analysis 16.3 (1956): 49–58.

     

    Dummett, M. “Can an Effect Precede Its Cause?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 28 (Supplement) (1954): 27–44.

     

    - “Bringing about the Past.” The Philosophical Review 73.3 (1964): 338–59.

     

    Truth and the Past. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.

     

    Flew, A. “Can an Effect Precede Its Cause?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 28 (Supplement) (1954): 45–62.

     

    Garrett, B. “Black on Backwards Causation” Thought 3.3 (2014): 230 – 233.

     

    Pears, D. F. “The Priority of Causes.” Analysis 17.3 (1957): 54–63.

     

    Roache, R. “Bilking the Bilking Argument.” Analysis 69.4 (2009): 605–11.

     

    Scriven, M. “Randomness and the Causal Order.” Analysis 17.1 (1956): 5–9.

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