Some Remarks on Backwards Causation
Brian Garrett, “Some Remarks on Backwards Causation,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71, no. 4 (2015): 695–704, DOI 10.17990/rpf/2015_71_4_0695.
Brian Garrett, “Some Remarks on Backwards Causation,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71, no. 4 (2015): 695–704, DOI 10.17990/rpf/2015_71_4_0695.
Type | Journal Article |
---|---|
Author | Brian Garrett |
Rights | © 2015 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural | © 2015 Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
Volume | 71 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 695-704 |
Publication | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
ISSN | 0870-5283; 2183-461X |
Date | 2015 |
DOI | 10.17990/rpf/2015_71_4_0695 |
Language | English |
Abstract |
Resumo: Neste texto, o autor centra-se em dois artigos clássicos – o de Max Black “Why cannot an effect precede its cause”? (1956) e o de Michael Dummett “Bringing about the Past” (1964) –, para argumentar que o “bilking argument” de Black, contra a possibilidade da causalidade invertida, falha o seu objectivo. Apesar de o autor concordar com Dummett, na possibilidade de um agente actuar no presente para que algo aconteça no passado, discorda da resposta dada por este último a um desafio céptico que lhe foi lançado, para mostrar a inutilidade de se alterar o passado. |
Date Added | 28/07/2015, 12:02:55 |
Modified | 10/12/2015, 15:22:24 |
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