Truth and the Metaphysics of Semantic and Logical Notions
Andrea Strollo, “Truth and the Metaphysics of Semantic and Logical Notions,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 79, no. 3 (2023): 917–36, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2023_79_3_0917.
Andrea Strollo, “Truth and the Metaphysics of Semantic and Logical Notions,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 79, no. 3 (2023): 917–36, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2023_79_3_0917.
Item Type | Journal Article |
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Author | Andrea Strollo |
Abstract | In contemporary philosophy, it is tempting to apply the metaphysics of properties to the specific case of truth, in the hope of making progress on the investigation of the latter. In this paper, I argue that a different approach, mostly independent from the metaphysics of properties and based on the naturalness, in Lewis’ sense, of semantic nations, is often a better alternative, both in general and in some specific cases. In particular, adopting the new perspective, I present a new problem of combining logical validity and strong truth pluralism, and offer a way to sharply distinguish deflationism and primitivism about truth. The main original upshot of the paper is offering a perspective on philosophy of truth that sheds new light on the general problem of truth and on some particular issues. |
Date | 2023 |
Language | English |
Rights | © 2023 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural |
Volume | 79 |
Pages | 917-936 |
Publication | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
DOI | 10.17990/RPF/2023_79_3_0917 |
Issue | 3 |
ISSN | 0870-5283 ; 2183-461X |
Date Added | 11/1/2023, 1:42:13 AM |
Modified | 11/1/2023, 1:48:34 AM |
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