Nikk Effingham, “The Metatheoretical Location of Our Commitments: Heterodox Truthmaking as a Case Study,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 3 (2024): 745–58, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_0745.
| Item Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Nikk Effingham |
| Abstract | This paper explores the ‘metatheoretical location’ of principles in metaphysical theories, using the debate between Cameron and Goff as a case study. These principles can be situated either in a pre-theoretical framework or within the process of theorizing itself. Traditional truthmaking theorists, like Goff, view truthmaking principles as pre-theoretical assumptions that guide metaphysical inquiry. In contrast, Cameron advocates for a heterodox approach, where such principles are treated as theoretical conclusions reached through contentious debate and argumentation. This distinction has significant implications for how theories are evaluated. By examining this debate, the paper highlights how the metatheoretical positioning of methodological principles influences theoretical discourse in analytic metaphysics. |
| Date | 2024 |
| Language | English |
| Rights | © 2024 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural |
| Volume | 80 |
| Pages | 745-758 |
| Publication | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| DOI | 10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_0745 |
| Issue | 3 |
| ISSN | 0870-5283 ; 2183-461X |
| Date Added | 10/30/2024, 8:52:04 PM |
| Modified | 10/30/2024, 8:58:20 PM |
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