Matheus Valente Leite, “Fregeanism and Cognitive Dynamics: An Essay about Demonstrative Thought in Diachronic Scenarios,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 72, no. 2–3 (2016): 615–36, DOI 10.17990/RPF/2016_72_2_0615.
| Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Matheus Valente Leite |
| Rights | © 2016 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural | © 2016 Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| Volume | 72 |
| Issue | 2-3 |
| Pages | 615-636 |
| Publication | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| ISSN | 0870-5283; 2183-461X |
| Date | 2016 |
| DOI | 10.17990/RPF/2016_72_2_0615 |
| Language | English |
| Abstract | This paper is about demonstrative thoughts in cases of perceptual tracking. We will assume, as the starting point of our discussion, the broadly Fregean thesis that singular content should be more refined than referential content in order to properly explain a thinker’s behavior and reasoning. We will analyze Recanati and Prosser’s Interdependence Theory in relation to cases of perceptual tracking and argue that they don’t fare better than the simpler Enthymematic Theory, according to which no distinct demonstrative tokens are ever associated with the same content. We will show how this last theory enable us to maintain some independently plausible theses about the content of singular tokens (e.g. the content of a singular token univocally determines its referent, it is transparent) at a lower cost than its contenders. We will defend this theory against the objection that it is psychologically implausible and make some remarks on the prospects of generalizing it to broader areas of thought and discourse. |
| Date Added | 19/10/2016, 12:26:51 |
| Modified | 25/10/2016, 10:20:20 |
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