Marco Simionato, “A ‘Modest’ Primitivist Theory of Truth: The Ineffability of Truth, Effability of the Correspondence Relation,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 79, no. 3 (2023): 937–64, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2023_79_3_0937.
| Item Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Marco Simionato |
| Abstract | The primitivist theory of truth, i.e., the view that truth cannot be analysed in more fundamental terms, has been cleverly revamped by Jamin Asay, who has combined a primitivist approach to the concept of truth with a deflationary approach to the (metaphysical) property of being true. This paper aims to adjust Asay’s primitivist theory to consistently include the primitiveness of the (pre-theoretical) correspondence relation, grasped by our correspondence intuition, alongside the primitiveness of truth. In the process, I apply a thesis by Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson, according to which the correspondence of beliefs to facts (broadly construed) can occur with no commitment to a correspondence theory of truth. Then I argue why Asay’s theory might not be able to account for the primitiveness of the pre-theoretical correspondence relation. Finally, I use a suggestion by André Kukla concerning the possible entailment between an ineffable insight and its effable consequences, to build a revised primitivist theory of truth. |
| Date | 2023 |
| Language | English |
| Rights | © 2023 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural |
| Volume | 79 |
| Pages | 937-964 |
| Publication | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| DOI | 10.17990/RPF/2023_79_3_0937 |
| Issue | 3 |
| ISSN | 0870-5283 ; 2183-461X |
| Date Added | 11/1/2023, 1:42:15 AM |
| Modified | 11/1/2023, 1:49:59 AM |
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