Is Correspondence Truth One or Many?

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Joseph Ulatowski, “Is Correspondence Truth One or Many?,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 79, no. 3 (2023): 1003–22, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2023_79_3_1003.

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Is Correspondence Truth One or Many?

Item Type	Journal Article
Author	Joseph Ulatowski
Abstract	On the correspondence theory of truth, a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to fact. Criticisms of the correspondence theory of truth have argued that such a strict interpretation of the correspondence relation will not be able to account for the truth of statements about fiction or mathematics. This challenge has resulted in the introduction of more permissive correspondence relations, such as Austin’s correspondence as correlation or Tarski’s correspondence as reference satisfaction. Recently, some mediated correspondence theorists of truth have proposed that the correspondence relation holds not only between thought and world but also between thought and language. In this paper, I argue that correspondence truth, direct or mediated, is not a monistic theory of truth, the view that there is one and only way for a proposition to be true. To argue for this position, I will have to show that each of the correspondence theories accept direct and indirect ways of understanding the correspondence relation as well as address potential objections to the view that correspondence theory is not singular and monolithic.
Date	2023
Language	English
Rights	© 2023 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural
Volume	79
Pages	1003-1022
Publication	Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
DOI	10.17990/RPF/2023_79_3_1003
Issue	3
ISSN	0870-5283 ; 2183-461X
Date Added	11/1/2023, 1:42:18 AM
Modified	11/1/2023, 1:53:18 AM

Notes:

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Is Correspondence Truth One or Many?

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