Ricardo Barroso Batista, “Razões de Participação Colectiva: entre Agência, Comportamento e Poderes,” in Educação e Cultura de Paz: Memória, Verdade e Perdão, 1st ed., ed. Carlos V. Estêvão et al., Axioma Series in Pedagogy and Philosophy of Education 5 (Braga: Axioma - Publicações da Faculdade de Filosofia, 2025), 359–84, https://doi.org/10.17990/AxiSeries/2025_05_359.
| Item Type | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Editor | Carlos V. Estêvão |
| Editor | José Manuel Martins Lopes |
| Editor | Ana Paula Pinto |
| Editor | Artur Ilharco Galvão |
| Editor | João Carlos Onofre Pinto |
| Editor | Maria José Lopes |
| Editor | Paulo C. Dias |
| Editor | Ricardo Barroso Batista |
| Author | Ricardo Barroso Batista |
| Abstract | This article revisits the Principle of Sufficient Reason in the social domain and develops an account of participatory reasons – a subset of social reasons that justify an individual in “doing their part” within a collectively valuable pattern that a group could, in principle, realize. It offers a formal specification of participatory reasons and distinguishes them from act-based reasons, whose justificatory force depends solely on the value and feasibility of the individual act. The paper argues that participatory reasons explain coordination settings (e.g., Hi-Lo dilemma games) and everyday phenomena such as conscientious voting, environmental restraint, and peace-promoting conduct. Three competing eligibility conceptions are analyzed: an agency-first view (requiring genuine group agency and shared intention), a behaviour-first view (requiring reliable convergence of conduct), and a powers-first view (requiring only the effective capacity of members to play their roles in a realizable collective pattern). Each is formally articulated via a corresponding condition (strong willingness, weak willingness, and two versions of a powers requirement) and tested against three objections: imprudence, opportunistic participation, and compensators. The assessment supports a powers-first conclusion, participatory reasons can exist without current shared intentions or actual success, provided the collective pattern is in-principle realizable and the agent’s contribution is feasible. Nonetheless, the practical priority of such reasons is context-sensitive and may be outweighed by prudential or other reasons when risks or costs are high. The result is a pluralist, formally grounded framework that clarifies when participatory reasons exist, how strong they are, and why they matter for ethical judgment, social cooperation, and political legitimacy. |
| Date | 2025 |
| Language | Portuguese |
| Library Catalog |  |
| URL | https://doi.org/10.17990/AxiSeries/2025_05_359 |
| Rights | © 2025 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural |
| Place | Braga |
| Publisher | Axioma - Publicações da Faculdade de Filosofia |
| ISBN | 978-972-697-397-3 978-972-697-398-0 |
| Pages | 359-384 |
| Series | Axioma Series in Pedagogy and Philosophy of Education |
| Series Number | 5 |
| Edition | 1 |
| Book Title | Educação e Cultura de Paz: Memória, Verdade e Perdão |
| Date Added | 11/6/2025, 4:55:44 PM |
| Modified | 11/6/2025, 8:30:45 PM |
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