Damian Islas Mondragon, “Ernst Mach, Karl R. Popper y Thomas S. Kuhn: Aportaciones al Estudio de los Experimentos Mentales,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 74, no. 1 (2018): 133–50, DOI 10.17990/RPF/2018_74_1_0133
| Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Damian Islas Mondragon |
| Rights | © 2018 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural | © 2018 Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| Volume | 74 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 133-150 |
| Publication | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| ISSN | 0870-5283 |
| Date | 2018 |
| DOI | 10.17990/RPF/2018_74_1_0133 |
| Language | Spanish |
| Abstract | Until relatively recent times very few philosophical studies about thought experiments were available. Among these pioneering works are those of Ernst Mach, Karl R. Popper and Thomas S. Kuhn, respectively. In this article, I begin by analyzing the way in which Mach understood this type of experiment. Later, I will review the positions developed by Popper and Kuhn on the matter. Afterwards I will analyze a thought experiment, the so-called “Stevin on the Inclined Plane”, in order to show that Mach reading of it is incorrect. At the end of the text I will discuss these three positions with the aim of showing that they contain, after all, the germ for a better understanding of thought experiments. |
| Date Added | 26/04/2018, 14:53:47 |
| Modified | 26/04/2018, 15:47:45 |
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