Exemplarist Virtue Theory and the Kant Complaint
Bruno Niederbacher, “Exemplarist Virtue Theory and the Kant Complaint,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 76, no. 1 (2020): 75–92, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2020_76_1_0075.
Bruno Niederbacher, “Exemplarist Virtue Theory and the Kant Complaint,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 76, no. 1 (2020): 75–92, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2020_76_1_0075.
| Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Bruno Niederbacher |
| Rights | © 2020 Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| Volume | 76 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 75-92 |
| Publication | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| ISSN | 0870-5283 |
| Date | 2020 |
| DOI | 10.17990/RPF/2020_76_1_0075 |
| Language | English |
| Abstract | Recently, Linda Zagzebski has proposed an “exemplarist virtue theory.” Her idea is to define moral terms such as “right act”, “duty”, “good end”, “good motive”, “virtue” etc. by referring directly to exemplars we admire upon reflection such as Confucius, Jesus Christ, St. Francis, St. Elisabeth etc. In this article, I will first present the main theses of Zagzebski’s theory and relate them to the program of virtue ethics. Secondly, I will confront her theory with what I call “the Kant Complaint” according to which one could give no “worse advice to morality than by trying to get it from examples”, and thirdly, I will argue that Zagzebski has the resources to counter several versions of this complaint. |
| Date Added | 4/30/2020, 12:02:46 AM |
| Modified | 4/30/2020, 11:35:34 AM |
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