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Dispositional Harmony: Examining the Causal Connection Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties

Dispositional Harmony: Examining the Causal Connection Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties

Jan Hauska, “Dispositional Harmony: Examining the Causal Connection Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 1135–44, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_1135.

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  • Dispositional Harmony: Examining the Causal Connection Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties

    Item Type Journal Article
    Author Jan Hauska
    Abstract Having recently emerged from the philosophical doldrums, the view that there are extrinsic dispositions has provoked questions about some aspects of their nature. One of the questions is whether causal bases of such dispositions would be extrinsic as well. Adopting the dominant causal conception of dispositional properties, I argue for the thesis of dispositional harmony, or for the proposition that dispositions agree with their bases in respect of intrinsicness (or lack thereof). The proposition is at odds with the claim that the causal bases of extrinsic dispositions are intrinsic. As the claim was supported by appeal to the disposition of a key to open a door, I discuss the disposition, contending that it is intrinsic. Then I deflect a possible rejoinder by pointing out that the disposition is also multi-track. Dispositional harmony entails that if there were extrinsic dispositions, at least some extrinsic properties would be causally efficacious.
    Date 2024
    Language English
    Rights © 2024 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural
    Volume 80
    Pages 1135-1144
    Publication Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
    DOI 10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_1135
    Issue 4
    Date Added 12/6/2024, 8:33:07 PM
    Modified 12/6/2024, 10:23:03 PM

    Tags:

    • activating conditions, causal bases, dispositions, intrinsic and extrinsic properties, multi-track dispositions.

    Notes:

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