Why Contextualist Approaches to Essences Are Worth Pursuing

Why Contextualist Approaches to Essences are worth Pursuing

Tags:

• contextualism, context-dependence, counterparts, David Lewis, essences, essentialism.

Notes:

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  Mallozzi, Antonella. “Putting Modal Metaphysics First.” Synthese 198, no. S8 (2021a): 1937–1956. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1828-2.

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  McGinn Colin. “On the Necessity of Origin.” Journal of Philosophy 73, no.5 (1976): 127-135. https://doi.org/10.2307/2025741.

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  Zylastra, Justin. “Essence, necessity, and definition.” Philosophical Studies 176, no. 2 (2019): 339-350. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-1018-y.