How to Avoid the Problem of the Question of the Rate of Time’s Passage

How to Avoid the Problem of the Question of the Rate of Time’s Passage

• Type	Journal Article
  Author	Jerzy Gołosz
  Rights	© 2015 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural | © 2015 Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
  Volume	71
  Issue	4
  Pages	807-820
  Publication	Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
  ISSN	0870-5283; 2183-461X
  Date	2015
  DOI	10.17990/rpf/2015_71_4_0807
  Language	English
  Abstract	Resumo: Neste artigo, analisamos algumas das versões mais recentes da objecção à existência de um fluxo do tempo baseadas na pergunta: “Com que velocidade flui o tempo?”. Mostramos que as respostas dadas para resolver este problema são implausíveis, pelo que propomos uma solução assente numa nova concepção de fluxo temporal. A teoria metafísica proposta desenvolve radicalmente as ideias de Broad e Prior, invalidando as objecções provenientes não só da questão sobre a taxa do fluir do tempo, como das respostas de tipo “segundo a segundo”. Palavras-chave: existência dinâmica, fluxo do tempo, presentismo, velocidade de passagem do tempo  Abstract: This paper analyzes some recent versions of the objection to the existence of the flow of time based on the question: “How fast does time flow?”. We show that the replies given to the problem are implausible and instead we propose a solution for the issue in the form of a conception of the flow of time which can avoid such difficulties. The proposed metaphysical theory develops the ideas of Broad and Prior in a radical way and invalidates the objection resulting from the question about the rate of passage and answers “second per second”. Keywords: flow of time; rate of time’s passage; presentism; dynamic existence
  Date Added	28/07/2015, 12:02:11
  Modified	10/12/2015, 15:33:52

  Tags:

  • dynamic existence
  • flow of time
  • presentism
  • rate of time’s passage

  Notes:

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