Everything You Think about Equivocation Is False
Bryan Frances, “Everything You Think about Equivocation Is False,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 81, no. 4 (2025): 1251–72, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2025_81_4_1251.
Bryan Frances, “Everything You Think about Equivocation Is False,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 81, no. 4 (2025): 1251–72, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2025_81_4_1251.
| Item Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Bryan Frances |
| Abstract | I show that virtually all the platitudes regarding equivocation—with notions such as ambiguity, lack of warrant upon disambiguation, and multiple reference or meaning—are false. I present fifteen stories meant to mark the boundaries and reveal the types of equivocation. The stories are used to argue for ten theses regarding equivocation. |
| Date | 2025 |
| Library Catalog | 401; 401.43; 401.45; 160; 401.41 |
| License | © 2026 by Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural |
| Volume | 81 |
| Publisher | Axioma - Publicações da Faculdade de Filosofia |
| Section | Philosophy of Language: New Frontiers in Meaning and Use |
| Pages | 1251-1272 |
| Publication | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| DOI | 10.17990/RPF/2025_81_4_1251 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Journal Abbr | RPF |
| ISSN | 0870-5283 ; 2183-461X |
| Date Added | 1/31/2026, 7:42:09 PM |
| Modified | 1/31/2026, 9:22:37 PM |
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