Say It, But Don’t Mean It
Daniel Nolan, “Say It, But Don’t Mean It,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 81, no. 4 (2025): 1047–82, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2025_81_4_1047.
Daniel Nolan, “Say It, But Don’t Mean It,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 81, no. 4 (2025): 1047–82, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2025_81_4_1047.
| Item Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Daniel Nolan |
| Abstract | Call “fictional assertions” sentences that look or sound like assertions, but which are produced as parts of fictions, or in talk engaged with fictions. In contrast to standard views about these sentences, this paper argues that these fictional assertions are genuinely assertions, and have the same semantics that their literal counterparts have. The difference lies in the pragmatics of communication, rather than in content or force. |
| Date | 2025 |
| Library Catalog | 401; 401.43; 401.45; 160; 401.41 |
| License | © 2026 by Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural |
| Volume | 81 |
| Publisher | Axioma - Publicações da Faculdade de Filosofia |
| Section | Philosophy of Language: New Frontiers in Meaning and Use |
| Pages | 1047-1082 |
| Publication | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| DOI | 10.17990/RPF/2025_81_4_1047 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Journal Abbr | RPF |
| ISSN | 0870-5283 ; 2183-461X |
| Date Added | 1/31/2026, 7:41:58 PM |
| Modified | 1/31/2026, 9:22:15 PM |
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