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Everything You Think about Equivocation Is False

Everything You Think about Equivocation Is False

Bryan Frances, “Everything You Think about Equivocation Is False,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 81, no. 4 (2025): 1251–72, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2025_81_4_1251.

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  • Everything You Think about Equivocation Is False

    Item Type Journal Article
    Author Bryan Frances
    Abstract I show that virtually all the platitudes regarding equivocation—with notions such as ambiguity, lack of warrant upon disambiguation, and multiple reference or meaning—are false. I present fifteen stories meant to mark the boundaries and reveal the types of equivocation. The stories are used to argue for ten theses regarding equivocation.
    Date 2025
    Library Catalog 401; 401.43; 401.45; 160; 401.41
    License © 2026 by Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural
    Volume 81
    Publisher Axioma - Publicações da Faculdade de Filosofia
    Section Philosophy of Language: New Frontiers in Meaning and Use
    Pages 1251-1272
    Publication Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
    DOI 10.17990/RPF/2025_81_4_1251
    Issue 4
    Journal Abbr RPF
    ISSN 0870-5283 ; 2183-461X
    Date Added 1/31/2026, 7:42:09 PM
    Modified 1/31/2026, 9:22:37 PM

    Tags:

    • philosophy of language
    • ambiguity
    • equivocation
    • fallacies
    • informal logic

    Notes:

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      Burge, Tyler. “Other Bodies.” In Thought and Object, edited by A. Woodfield, 97-120. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

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      Stoneham, Tom. “On Equivocation.” Philosophy 78, no. 4 (2003): 515-19. 10.1017/s0031819103000469

      Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani, and John Hawthorne. Narrow Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198785965.001.0001

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