Justin Sytsma, “Language or Underlying Mechanism? Investigating Single versus Joint Evaluations for Causal Attributions,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 81, no. 4 (2025): 1099–132, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2025_81_4_1099.
| Item Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Justin Sytsma |
| Abstract | Recent research in experimental philosophy indicates that norms matter for the causal attributions that people offer and endorse, at least in English, although there is a good deal of debate concerning why they matter. This includes disagreements about the nature of the question. In line with x-phi’s descriptive program, some researchers have focused on detailing how people use the relevant bits of language. By contrast, researchers working within x-phi’s cognitive program have offered proposals about the underlying mechanisms by which the concept of causation gets expressed in that language. Most prominently the latter includes counterfactual accounts, which explain the impact on norms on causal attributions in terms of the salience of counterfactuals. In this paper, I reconsider the evidence offered by Icard et al. (2017) in favor of a counterfactual explanation, illustrating how subtle differences in the linguistic context provided by the researchers can influence participants responses in important ways. Specifically, I report a large study (N=3678) in which I vary whether participants are asked a question about just one of the two agents involved in the scenarios tested by Icard et al. (single evaluations) or about both agents (joint evaluations). The results suggest two evaluation effects: there is a general trend for the causal ratings in these cases to be lower when using single evaluations than when using joint evaluations, and this difference is larger when the agent asked about violates an injunctive norm. I argue that how we think about these effects has important implications for the plausibility of counterfactual accounts. |
| Date | 2025 |
| Library Catalog | 401; 401.43; 401.45; 160; 401.41 |
| License | © 2026 by Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural |
| Volume | 81 |
| Publisher | Axioma - Publicações da Faculdade de Filosofia |
| Section | Philosophy of Language: New Frontiers in Meaning and Use |
| Pages | 1099-1132 |
| Publication | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| DOI | 10.17990/RPF/2025_81_4_1099 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Journal Abbr | RPF |
| ISSN | 0870-5283 ; 2183-461X |
| Date Added | 1/31/2026, 7:42:00 PM |
| Modified | 1/31/2026, 9:22:20 PM |
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