The Causal Nature of Dispositions and Modality



• The Causal Nature of Dispositions and Modality

  Type	Journal Article
  Author	Jan Hauska
  Rights	© 2021 by Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
  Volume	77
  Issue	4
  Pages	1213-1242
  Publication	Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
  ISSN	0870-5283
  Date	2021
  DOI	10.17990/RPF/2021_77_4_1213
  Language	English
  Abstract	Theories of modality which invoke possible worlds have recently been challenged by accounts that appeal to dispositional properties. A prominent strand of the accounts maintains that there is an intimate link between dispositions and possibility. The link is said to be captured by the proposition that, at first approximation, a state of affairs is possible just in case there is some actual disposition whose manifestation is (or includes) the state. Focusing on the most detailed exposition and defence of this approach, put forward by Barbara Vetter, I critically examine the adequacy of the view of dispositional properties on which it rests and which seems to be required by any plausible dispositionalist account of possibility. In the course of doing so, I offer arguments in favour of the causal nature of dispositions.
  Date Added	1/31/2022, 10:52:07 PM
  Modified	1/31/2022, 11:32:58 PM

  Tags:

  • causal relation, dispositional properties, manifestations, powers, theories of modality

  Notes:

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