Michał Oleksowicz, “New Mechanism and Causality: The Case of Interactive Causal Pluralism,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 77, no. 4 (2021): 1175–1208, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2021_77_4_1175.
| Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Michał Oleksowicz |
| Rights | © 2021 by Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| Volume | 77 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1175-1208 |
| Publication | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| ISSN | 0870-5283 |
| Date | 2021 |
| DOI | 10.17990/RPF/2021_77_4_1175 |
| Language | English |
| Abstract | This paper focuses on the causal pluralism that emerges from the new mechanistic discussion on causality. The reason for our choice of the New Mechanical Philosophy (NMP) is twofold. Firstly, the NMP is one of the dominant approaches within the current philosophy of science and has produced very extensive literature on the problem of causation. Secondly, the intersection of the understanding of nature via mechanisms and the focus on explanatory practice across different scientific fields has brought a great renewal of causal explanations within the mechanistic framework. After characterizing the four dominant approaches to causation present in the NMP, we argue that each approach gives an important insight into the philosophical discussion about causality, but at the same time presents certain limitations. The main philosophical issues and their internal problems with respect to each approach are discussed, and in the following sections, we explicate the similarities and differences between those approaches. In the final section, we address the issue of causal pluralism and argue that the new mechanical approach to causation deserves its own place in the debate on causality, since it is an interesting case of interactive pluralism with respect to causality. |
| Date Added | 1/31/2022, 10:52:04 PM |
| Modified | 1/31/2022, 11:30:01 PM |
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