Non-Philosophers’ Judgements of Metaphysical Explanations Are Context-Sensitive



• Non-philosophers’ Judgements of Metaphysical Explanations are Context-Sensitive

  Item Type	Journal Article
  Author	Andrew J. Latham
  Author	Kristie Miller
  Abstract	Empirical investigation of the conditions under which people prefer, or disprefer, causal explanation, has suggested to many that our judgements about what causally explains what are context-sensitive in a number of ways. This has led many to suppose that whether or not a causal explanation obtains depends on contextual factors: that causal explanation is context-sensitive. Surprisingly, most accounts of metaphysical explanation, by contrast, suppose it to be context insensitive. Only recently have accounts been developed of metaphysical explanation on which it is context-sensitive. To date, however, there is no empirical evidence about the context sensitivity of metaphysical explanation. In what follows we test the judgements of non-philosophers, and find that amongst non-philosophers, at least, metaphysical explanations are context-sensitive. We then consider the implications of this finding for theorising about metaphysical explanation.
  Date	2024
  Language	English
  Rights	© 2024 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural
  Volume	80
  Pages	759-784
  Publication	Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
  DOI	10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_0759
  Issue	3
  ISSN	0870-5283 ; 2183-461X
  Date Added	10/30/2024, 8:52:05 PM
  Modified	10/30/2024, 9:00:00 PM

  Tags:

  • experimental philosophy, explanation, metaphysical explanation, non-causal explanation.

  Notes:

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