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Symmetry-Breaking Indeterminism as a Challenge to Generalism

Symmetry-Breaking Indeterminism as a Challenge to Generalism

Tomasz Bigaj, “Symmetry-Breaking Indeterminism as a Challenge to Generalism,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 1041–56, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_1041.

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  • Symmetry-breaking Indeterminism as a Challenge to Generalism

    Item Type Journal Article
    Author Tomasz Bigaj
    Abstract The debate between individualism and generalism (qualitativism) concerns, inter alia, the question of whether qualitative identity implies numerical identity. One important argument against the affirmative answer to this question is based on an analysis of cases known as symmetry-breaking indeterministic processes, including the case of a collapsing tower. Generalism implies that all processes of that kind are deterministic, contrary to our snap judgment. This article contains a multifaceted analysis of the above argument against generalism, taking into account its metaphysical, scientific and modal aspects. It is suggested that the intuition of indeterminism regarding the considered cases can be explained by a distinct phenomenon of indeterminacy affecting the diachronic identity of participating objects. It is also observed that both individualism and generalism are unable to formulate a theory which could make definite predictions that are more specific than the ones made in purely qualitative language. This strongly suggests that the purported indeterminism of the considered scenarios is not genuine. Finally, the modal analysis shows how generalism is capable of expressing the idea of alternative possibilities without violating the fundamental assumption of determinism. This approach is based on the Lewisian counterpart semantics for quantified modal logic with same-world counterparts.
    Date 2024
    Language English
    Rights © 2024 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural
    Volume 80
    Pages 1041-1056
    Publication Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
    DOI 10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_1041
    Issue 4
    Date Added 12/6/2024, 8:33:00 PM
    Modified 12/6/2024, 10:17:56 PM

    Tags:

    • generalism, indeterminism, persistence, predictions, symmetry-breaking permutation, the hole argument.

    Notes:

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