Scepticism About Neo-Aristotelian Essences

Scepticism About Neo-Aristotelian Essences

Tags:

• essence, Fine, identity, Lowe, necessity, sortal, substance.

Notes:

• Cowling, Sam. “The Modal View of Essence.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43, no. 2 (2013): 248–66. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2013.827395.

  Dunn, J. Michael ‘Relevant predication III: essential properties’’, in Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap. Edited by Dunn, J. Michael, and Anil Gupta, 77-95. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0681-5.

  Fine, Kit. “Essence and Modality: The Second Philosophical Perspectives Lecture.” Philosophical Perspectives 8 (1994): 1-16. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214160.

  Fine, Kit; “Ontological Dependence”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1995): 269-90. https://doi.org/10.1093/aristote.

  Fine, K. “Senses of Essence”. In Modality, Morality, and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus. Edited by W. Sinnott-Armstrong, D. Raffman, and N. Asher, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995: 53–73. 052144082

  Fine, Kit. “Semantics for the Logic of Essence.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 29, no. 6 (December 2000): 543–84. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026591900038.

  Fine, Kit. “ Necessity and Non‐Existence.” In Modality and Tense, by Kit Fine, 321–54, 1st ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199278709.003.0010.

  Gorman, Michael. “The essential and the accidental.” Ratio 18, no. 3 (September 2005): 276–89. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2005.00290.x.

  Jago, Mark. “Knowing How Things Might Have Been.” Synthese 198, no. S8 (April 2021): 1981–99. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1869-6.

  Kripke, Saul ‘Naming and Necessity’. In Semantics of Natural Language. 2. ed., 3. Print, 252-355. Edited by Davidson, Donald, and Gilbert Harman, Synthese Library 40. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7.

  Kripke, Saul A. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press, 1980. 0674598458

  Lowe, E. J. “Review: How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties.” Mind 116, no. 463 (July 1, 2007): 762–66. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzm762.

  Lowe, E. J. “Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 (July 2008): 23–48. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246108000568.

  Lowe, E. J. “Locke on Real Essence and Water as a Natural Kind: A Qualified Defence.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85, no. 1 (June 1, 2011): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00193.x.

  Lowe, E. J. “The Probable Simplicity of Personal Identity.” Chapter. In Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?, edited by Georg Gasser and Matthias Stefan, 137–55. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12035.

  Lowe, E. J. “What Is the Source of Our Knowledge of Modal Truths?” Mind 121, no. 484 (October 1, 2012): 919–50. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzs122.

  Lowe, E. J. “Objects and Criteria of Identity.” In A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Bob Hale, Crispin Wright, and Alexander Miller, 1st ed., 990–1012. Wiley, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118972090.ch39.

  Mackie, Penelope. How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. 1st ed. Oxford University Press Oxford, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199272204.001.0001.

  Wiggins, David. Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1967. 10: 0631103708 

  Wiggins, D. 2001. Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612756

  Wildman, Nathan. “Modality, Sparsity, and Essence.” The Philosophical Quarterly 63, no. 253 (October 2013): 760–82. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.12059.