Thomas Hofweber, “Fundamental Ontology and Esoteric Metaphysics: How to Settle the Question,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 753–82, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_0753.
| Item Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Thomas Hofweber |
| Abstract | How can we settle whether key metaphysical questions should properly be stated by relying on a substantial notion of metaphysical priority, like grounding or being metaphysically more fundamental than? Relatedly, how can we settle whether ontology should properly be seen as the disciple that studies either what there is or else only what there is fundamentally? Which way of thinking about ontology brings out its proper metaphysical significance? One challenge to giving notions like grounding or fundamentality key roles in metaphysics is that these notions are insufficiently clear, and that metaphysics tied to them turns into esoteric metaphysics. To make progress on these issues I propose a particular challenge—the cognitive function challenge—that needs to be met for metaphysics based on a substantial notion of priority not to turn into objectionable esoteric metaphysics. I also outline some reasons why other approaches that aim to establish such notions as legitimate for metaphysics fall short and how the cognitive function challenge might be met. |
| Date | 2024 |
| Language | English |
| Rights | © 2024 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural |
| Volume | 80 |
| Pages | 753-782 |
| Publication | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| DOI | 10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_0753 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Date Added | 12/6/2024, 8:32:45 PM |
| Modified | 12/6/2024, 10:02:35 PM |
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