Can It Be Ok to Break the Maxim of Manner in Argumentation?

Can It Be Ok to Break the Maxim of Manner in Argumentation?

Tags:

• analogy
• argumentation
• ambiguity
• autonomy
• Gricean maxim of manner
• narrative argument
• standing

Notes:

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