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Propositions Represent Inherently Without Explaining Intentionality

Propositions Represent Inherently Without Explaining Intentionality

Tristan Grøtvedt Haze, “Propositions Represent Inherently Without Explaining Intentionality,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 81, no. 4 (2025): 1163–72, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2025_81_4_1163.

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  • Propositions Represent Inherently Without Explaining Intentionality

    Item Type Journal Article
    Author Tristan Grøtvedt Haze
    Abstract Propositions are abstract mind-independent entities expressed by sentences and believed by believers, they inherently have representational properties, and their having these is basic to them rather than being the sort of thing we should seek to explain. Here I defend this set of views from a line of objection, recently exemplified by Peter Hanks and Scott Soames, which complains that it affords no good explanation of intentionality in terms of propositions. I argue that the complaint is misplaced; propositions have already earned their keep without affording any such explanation. In fact, on the kind of view of the epistemology of the ontology of propositions that I favour, they earned their keep so long ago that we should not think of them as theoretical posits any more than we think of our friends or our clothes as such.
    Date 2025
    Library Catalog 401; 401.43; 401.45; 160; 401.41
    License © 2026 by Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural
    Volume 81
    Publisher Axioma - Publicações da Faculdade de Filosofia
    Section Philosophy of Language: New Frontiers in Meaning and Use
    Pages 1163-1172
    Publication Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
    DOI 10.17990/RPF/2025_81_4_1163
    Issue 4
    Journal Abbr RPF
    ISSN 0870-5283 ; 2183-461X
    Date Added 1/31/2026, 7:42:04 PM
    Modified 1/31/2026, 9:22:26 PM

    Notes:

    • Brown, T.D. “Propositions are not representational.” Synthese 199, 5045–5060, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-03014-2

      Davis, Wayne A. “Cheap Propositions.” In Philosophy, Cognition and Pragmatics, edited by Alessandro Capone, Pietro Perconti, and Roberto Graci, 3–21. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50109-8

      Grzankowski, Alex and Buchanan, Ray “Propositions on the Cheap,” Philosophical Studies 176, no. 12: 3159–3178, 2019 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1168-6

      Hanks, Peter. Propositional Content. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684892.001.0001

      Haze, Tristan Grøtvedt. Meaning and Metaphysical Necessity. Routledge, 2022.

      King, Jeffrey C., Scott Soames, and Jeff Speaks. New Thinking About Propositions. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693764.001.0001

      Soames, Scott. “Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content,” Philosophical Topics 15(1): 47–87, 1987.

      Soames, Scott. What Is Meaning? Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400833948

      Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Blackwell, 1953.

      Tags:

      • representation
      • propositions
      • ontology
      • philosophy of language
      • intentionality

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