Three Objections to DeRose’s Contextualism

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Jonathan Tallant, “Three Objections to DeRose’s Contextualism,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 81, no. 4 (2025): 1083–98, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2025_81_4_1083.

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Three Objections to DeRose’s Contextualism

Item Type	Journal Article
Author	Jonathan Tallant
Abstract	Contextualism in epistemology, as developed by Keith DeRose, holds that the truth of knowledge attributions depends on the epistemic context of the attributor. This paper presents three objections to DeRose’s formulation of contextualism, each aimed at undermining its standard motivations. First, I argue that the natural-language methodology typically used to support contextualism is insufficient to establish its semantic conclusions. By constructing parallel HIGH/LOW cases involving the predicate ‘is real’, I suggest that if such arguments were sound, they would commit us to implausible forms of metaphysical indexicality, thereby weakening the natural-language motivation for contextualism about knowledge. Second, I challenge the claim that contextualism offers a distinctive explanation of sceptical scenarios. I introduce symmetric SHIGH/SLOW cases in which raising epistemic standards appears to license, rather than undermine, certain knowledge attributions, casting doubt on the asymmetry required for the contextualist response to scepticism. Finally, I argue that there are contexts in which ‘knows’ is correctly applied despite the absence of belief, suggesting that variation in knowledge attributions sometimes reflects shifts in meaning rather than shifts in epistemic standards. Taken together, these considerations do not show contextualism to be false, but they significantly weaken the case for its standard motivations.
Date	2025
Library Catalog	401; 401.43; 401.45; 160; 401.41
License	© 2026 by Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural
Volume	81
Publisher	Axioma - Publicações da Faculdade de Filosofia
Section	Philosophy of Language: New Frontiers in Meaning and Use
Pages	1083-1098
Publication	Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
DOI	10.17990/RPF/2025_81_4_1083
Issue	4
Journal Abbr	RPF
ISSN	0870-5283 ; 2183-461X
Date Added	1/31/2026, 7:41:59 PM
Modified	1/31/2026, 9:22:18 PM

Notes:

Bach, Kent. “The Emperor’s New “Knows”,” in Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge Meaning and Truth, ed G Preyer and G Peter Oxford University Press, 2005

Bruekner, Anthony. “The Elusive Virtues of Contextualism,” Philosophical Studies 118, no 3, 401-405 (2004): https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000026463.36083.57

DeRose, Keith. “Solving the Skeptical Problem,’ The Philosophical Review 104, no. 1 (1995): 1-52 https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199564477.003.0001

DeRose, Keith. “Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense,” in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology ed J Greco and E Sosa (1999)

DeRose, Keith. “Single Scoreboard Semantics,” Philosophical Studies 119, no 1/2 (2004): 1-21 https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000029347.01790.f2

DeRose, Keith. “Bamboozled by Our Own Words”: Semantic Blindness and Some Arguments Against Contextualism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73, no 2(2006): 316-38. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00620.x

Schaffer, J. “What Shifts? Thresholds, Standards or Alternatives?” in Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge Meaning and Truth, ed G Preyer and G Peter Oxford University Press, 2005

Wright, C. “Contextualism and Scepticism: Even-Handedness, Factivity and Surreptitiously Raising Standards,” The Philosophical Quarterly 55, no. 219 (2005): 236 – 262. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00397.x