|Rights||© 2020 Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia|
|Publication||Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia|
|Abstract||This paper explores some parallels between the concept of action as it is deployed in two theoretical projects: constructing a virtue-ethical account of right action; and explaining human actions in (event) causal terms. Although one project is normative and the other non-normative, I argue that they face essentially the same fundamental challenge: both have a difficult time dealing with the familiar fact that persons have the ability to act out of character. For virtue ethics, this fact threatens to undermine its most distinctive account of what makes an action right, one that grounds rightness in virtuous character. For causal theories of action, it makes trouble for the idea that all human actions can be explained adequately within an event-causal framework.|
|Date Added||4/30/2020, 12:02:45 AM|
|Modified||4/30/2020, 11:34:06 AM|
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