Dispositionalism at Work: A Causal Theory of Perception



• Dispositionalism at Work: A Causal Theory of Perception

  Type	Journal Article
  Author	Christian Kanzian
  Rights	© 2021 by Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
  Volume	77
  Issue	4
  Pages	1297-1314
  Publication	Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
  ISSN	0870-5283
  Date	2021
  DOI	10.17990/RPF/2021_77_4_1297
  Language	English
  Abstract	This paper seeks to show how a proper version of dispositionalism, taking powers as basic elements of reality, may figure as a causal theory of perception. On the basis of this argument, the paper draws some further conclusions, which may indicate the explanatory competence of such a disposition-affine theory of causality, for example in terms of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, as well as an ontological account of mere potentialities of active capacities to perceive and of “privations,” respectively.
  Date Added	1/31/2022, 10:52:12 PM
  Modified	1/31/2022, 11:37:08 PM

  Tags:

  • dispositions, modes, powers, potencies, primary/secondary qualities, substance-ontology

  Notes:

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