On Backwards Causation
Brian Garrett, “On Backwards Causation,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 77, no. 4 (2021): 1209–12, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2021_77_4_1209.
Brian Garrett, “On Backwards Causation,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 77, no. 4 (2021): 1209–12, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2021_77_4_1209.
Type | Journal Article |
---|---|
Author | Brian Garrett |
Rights | © 2021 by Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
Volume | 77 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages | 1209-1212 |
Publication | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
ISSN | 0870-5283 |
Date | 2021 |
DOI | 10.17990/RPF/2021_77_4_1209 |
Language | English |
Abstract | In our world we never observe an effect which is earlier than its cause. All of our experience is of future-directed (or perhaps simultaneous) causation. But many have thought that backwards causation is at least logically or metaphysically possible. Max Black (1956) famously argued against this thought. I think his argument fails, but it’s still instructive. The correct rejoinder to Black teaches us what backwards causation must be like in a world of free agents, and implies that we can never have reason to bring about past events (in a world with backwards causal chains). |
Date Added | 1/31/2022, 10:52:05 PM |
Modified | 1/31/2022, 11:31:48 PM |
Black, Max. “Why Cannot an Effect Precede Its Cause?” Analysis 16.3 (1956): 49–58.
Dummett, Michael. “Bringing about the Past”. The Philosophical Review 73 (1964): 338–59.
Garrett, Brian. “Max Black and Backwards Causation”. Argumenta 1–5 (2021). doi:10.14275/2465-2334/20200.gar