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On the Deferential Use of Phenomenal Concepts

On the Deferential Use of Phenomenal Concepts

Julia Telles de Menezes, “On the Deferential Use of Phenomenal Concepts,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 72, no. 2–3 (2016): 573–96, DOI 10.17990/RPF/2016_72_2_0573.

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On the Deferential Use of Phenomenal Concepts

  • Type Journal Article
    Author Julia Telles de Menezes
    Rights © 2016 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural | © 2016 Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
    Volume 72
    Issue 2-3
    Pages 573-596
    Publication Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
    ISSN 0870-5283; 2183-461X
    Date 2016
    DOI 10.17990/RPF/2016_72_2_0573
    Language English
    Abstract Recently certain physicalists have mobilized a special kind of concept in order to respond to some challenges to the physicalist thesis, challenges that aim to show the apparent incompatibility between the subjective character of consciousness (qualia) and physicalism. The paper will be divided in three parts, first, I will take some time to deal with terminology issues and contextualize the debate around phenomenal concepts. Next, I want to expose Michael Tye and Derek Ball’s objection to the conception of phenomenal concepts and finally I want to propose that Ball and Tye’s argument is flawed. First, it is problematic to apply social externalism to phenomenal concepts. However, granting that this might be the case, we may still change phenomenal concepts constraints as suggested by Torin Alter. My conclusion is that although Ball and Tye show that possession condition may not be what marks the difference between phenomenal and physical concepts, the drastic conclusion that there are no phenomenal concept is false.
    Date Added 19/10/2016, 12:26:49
    Modified 25/10/2016, 10:16:59


    • phenomenal concepts,
    • philosophy of mind,
    • physicalism,
    • social externalism


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