Aquinas, Geach, and the Inner Acts of the Will
Michał Głowala, “Aquinas, Geach, and the Inner Acts of the Will,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 79, no. 1–2 (2023): 375–92, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2023_79_1_0375.
Michał Głowala, “Aquinas, Geach, and the Inner Acts of the Will,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 79, no. 1–2 (2023): 375–92, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2023_79_1_0375.
Item Type | Journal Article |
---|---|
Author | Michał Głowala |
Abstract | In the paper I discuss Geach’s rejection of volitions (inner acts of the will) both in the exegesis of Aquinas and in systematic action theory – a rejection followed by some analytical commentators of Aquinas (like Davies and Kenny). I claim that Geach’s interpretation of Aquinas’s action theory in terms of tendencies (treating the will as a special kind of tendency) enables – pace Geach – a sound defense of volitionism both in the exegesis of Aquinas and in the action theory. In other words, I offer arguments in favour of volitions (inner acts of the will) starting from some insights to be found in Geach, and I response to some standard objections against volitionism. Moreover, I try to sketch a framework (based on an ontology of tendencies suggested by Geach) suitable to discuss some other volitionist claims. I proceed in four steps: first I introduce the definition of a volition or inner act of the will that may be ascribed to various camps in the volitionism debate; then I discuss three main arguments of Geach against volitionism – the argument from trying, the argument from voluntary omissions, and the argument from natural theology. I pay special attention to the issue of the timing of volitions. |
Date | 2023 |
Language | English |
Rights | © 2023 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural |
Volume | 79 |
Pages | 375-392 |
Publication | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
DOI | 10.17990/RPF/2023_79_1_0375 |
Issue | 1-2 |
ISSN | 0870-5283 ; 2183-461X |
Date Added | 31/07/2023, 7:21:49 PM |
Modified | 31/07/2023, 9:28:56 PM |
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