Ryo Tanaka, “Semantic Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Inter-Personal Mental Ascription: A Neglected Puzzle,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 3 (2024): 819–40, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_0819.
| Item Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Ryo Tanaka |
| Abstract | In this article, to revitalize the discussion on semantic externalism’s implications on the issue of content self-knowledge, I will argue that semantic externalism generates in fact two related but distinct skeptical puzzles concerning the presumption of truth attached to our mental self-ascriptions. The first is to explain how I can correctly ascribe mental states to myself, and the second is to explain how others can ascribe thoughts to me by taking my expressions of such self-ascriptions at face value. In my view, although the first has been sufficiently addressed in the literature, the second has been more or less neglected. Furthermore, as I will argue, theorists must respond to both of the questions to fully show the compatibility of our ordinary conception of self-knowledge and semantic externalism. As a case study, I will introduce Dorit Bar-On’s neo-expressivism as an account of self-knowledge that provides a promising answer to the first question and argue that it is still incomplete in that it does not address the second skeptical puzzle. To shed light on the nature of the puzzle in question further, I will also explore its possible solutions in the neo-expressivist framework. |
| Date | 2024 |
| Language | English |
| Rights | © 2024 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural |
| Volume | 80 |
| Pages | 819-840 |
| Publication | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| DOI | 10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_0819 |
| Issue | 3 |
| ISSN | 0870-5283 ; 2183-461X |
| Date Added | 10/30/2024, 8:52:10 PM |
| Modified | 10/30/2024, 9:06:42 PM |
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