Junyeol Kim, “Fregean Aletheic Objectualism, the Flaw of False Assertion, and Truth as a Norm of Assertion,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 3 (2024): 785–804, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_0785.
| Item Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Junyeol Kim |
| Abstract | Gottlob Frege is an aletheic objectualist who regards truth as an object. For him, truth is the truth-value True, which is an object referred to by true sentences. Some interpreters argue that Frege’s claim that the True is an object is merely a byproduct of the technical features of his formal logic, Begriffsschrift. However, Frege’s works instead suggest that aletheic objectualism constitutes his philosophical position on the metaphysics of truth. Although Fregean aletheic objectualism may seem counterintuitive and unfruitful, it is, in fact, quite useful. Viewing truth as an object provides a new explanation for why there is a pro tanto reason to consider false assertion flawed. This explanation in turn strengthens support for the popular view that assertion is a norm-laden speech act. |
| Date | 2024 |
| Language | English |
| Rights | © 2024 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural |
| Volume | 80 |
| Pages | 785-804 |
| Publication | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| DOI | 10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_0785 |
| Issue | 3 |
| ISSN | 0870-5283 ; 2183-461X |
| Date Added | 10/30/2024, 8:52:07 PM |
| Modified | 10/30/2024, 9:01:06 PM |
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