Presentation |
Analytic Metaphysics represents a recent evolution of one of the oldest philosophical disciplines, now redefined by the methods of analytic philosophy. This contemporary approach reformulates the traditional ontological questions about existence, reality, and the nature of the Universe, prioritizing rigorous logical analysis and language. Analytic metaphysics, contrasted with continental ontology or traditional metaphysics, has surpassed the popularity of classical metaphysics, establishing itself as the predominant metaphysical stream in philosophical thought. In this special issue of the Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia (Portuguese Journal of Philosophy), we reflect on the current dynamics of analytic metaphysics, emphasizing its continuity with the metaphysical tradition or on new perspectives and pivotal issues driving analytic ontology.
Analytic metaphysics, as a contemporary branch of philosophical research, originated from the analytic tradition. This movement emerged in the early 20th century, driven by a desire for greater clarity and rigor in philosophical inquiry. Philosophers such as Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein were pioneers of this movement, advocating a methodology based on precise linguistic argumentation and rigorous logical analysis. Despite the advancements promoted by analytic philosophy, this period was also marked by a profound crisis for metaphysics. Influenced by the rigidity and the spectrum of the new logical positivism, the philosophical community began to view metaphysics with increasing skepticism, often considering it speculative and devoid of any meaningful or empirical content. This view became dominant, dismissing traditional metaphysical questions as pseudo-questions, i.e., devoid of empirical content and therefore devoid of real meaning. However, this trend began to shift with the influence of figures such as W. Quine, who played a key role in revitalizing metaphysics within the analytic tradition, and is often considered the founder of the new “analytic metaphysics.” Notably, his challenge to the then analytic-synthetic distinction in his famous paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” had profound implications for logical positivism and the verification principle. Quine argued that there was no clear boundary between purely analytic propositions (known through understanding alone) and synthetic propositions (known through experience), thus breaking the dogmatic boundaries between conceptual analysis and empirical representation. This perspective opened the possibility of reappreciating ontological questions that had until then been marginalized.
This resurgence of metaphysical thought was further propelled in three successive phases. Initially, scientific realism and naturalism as metaphysical themes were rehabilitated by thinkers such as G. H. von Wright and Arthur Prior. In a second phase, the topic of universals, abstract objects, and essences were reinserted into analytic discourse by D. Lewis and D. M. Armstrong. In a third phase, M. Loux and particularly S. Kripke added new dimensions to analytic metaphysics with their theories on “rigid names” and on modal logic and semantics. These contributions significantly shaped the development of analytic metaphysics, particularly in terms of the nature of reference, identity, and modality. These advances, which extended from the 1960s to the present day, mark a significant period in the history of analytic philosophy where metaphysical explorations, previously considered obsolete, gain new vitality and relevance.
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Contents |
Ricardo Barroso Batista and Bruno Nobre, “Explorations in Contemporary Analytic Metaphysics: Mind, Identity, and Society,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 3 (2024): 733–42, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_0733.
Nikk Effingham, “The Metatheoretical Location of Our Commitments: Heterodox Truthmaking as a Case Study,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 3 (2024): 745–58, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_0745.
Andrew J. Latham and Kristie Miller, “Non-Philosophers’ Judgements of Metaphysical Explanations Are Context-Sensitive,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 3 (2024): 759–84, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_0759.
Junyeol Kim, “Fregean Aletheic Objectualism, the Flaw of False Assertion, and Truth as a Norm of Assertion,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 3 (2024): 785–804, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_0785.
Barry Allen, “Experience, Experiments, and the History of Empiricism,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 3 (2024): 805–12, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_0805.
Brian Garrett and Jeremiah Joven Joaquin, “Reassessing Kripke’s Anti-Materialism and Almog’s Challenge,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 3 (2024): 815–18, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_0815.
Ryo Tanaka, “Semantic Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Inter-Personal Mental Ascription: A Neglected Puzzle,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 3 (2024): 819–40, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_0819.
Joshua Lee Harris, “Indeterminacy and the Immateriality of Thought: Ross on Natural and Formal Structures,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 3 (2024): 841–62, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_0841.
Ben Schermbrucker, “Brute Fact Cosmology and the Fundamentality of Consciousness,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 3 (2024): 863–92, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_0863.
Cei Maslen, “Degree of Causal Contribution and Degree of Moral Responsibility: Using Shapley Values as a Measure,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 3 (2024): 895–916, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_0895.
Michael Politz, “Personal Identity: Analytic Metaphysics in Dialogue with Thomistic Anthropology,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 3 (2024): 917–42, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_0917.
Adrián Solís, “La Artefactificación: Un nuevo problema para el Esencialismo Intencional de los Artefactos,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 3 (2024): 943–78, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_0943.
Murat Baç, “Ceasing to Exist and Harm Due to Loss of Vitality: A Different Approach to Metaphysics of Death,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 3 (2024): 979–94, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_0979.
Michaël Bauwens, “Social Metaphysics, Social Ontology and the Possibility of Social Reality,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 3 (2024): 997–1026, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_0997.
Peter Baumann, “The Social and the Individual: Reduction without Identity,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 3 (2024): 1027–48, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_1027.
Piet Strydom, “The Cognitive Order of Society: Radicalizing the Ontological Turn in Critical Theory,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 3 (2024): 1049–76, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_1049.
Ricardo Barroso Batista, “Book Review - Turkis, Martin E.. The Metaphysics of Michael Polanyi Toward a Post-Critical Platonism. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024.,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 3 (2024): 1079–82, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_3_1079.
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