Presentation |
Analytic Metaphysics represents a recent evolution of one of the oldest philosophical disciplines, now redefined by the methods of analytic philosophy. This contemporary approach reformulates the traditional ontological questions about existence, reality, and the nature of the Universe, prioritizing rigorous logical analysis and language. Analytic metaphysics, contrasted with continental ontology or traditional metaphysics, has surpassed the popularity of classical metaphysics, establishing itself as the predominant metaphysical stream in philosophical thought. In this special issue of the Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia (Portuguese Journal of Philosophy), we reflect on the current dynamics of analytic metaphysics, emphasizing its continuity with the metaphysical tradition or on new perspectives and pivotal issues driving analytic ontology.
Analytic metaphysics, as a contemporary branch of philosophical research, originated from the analytic tradition. This movement emerged in the early 20th century, driven by a desire for greater clarity and rigor in philosophical inquiry. Philosophers such as Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein were pioneers of this movement, advocating a methodology based on precise linguistic argumentation and rigorous logical analysis. Despite the advancements promoted by analytic philosophy, this period was also marked by a profound crisis for metaphysics. Influenced by the rigidity and the spectrum of the new logical positivism, the philosophical community began to view metaphysics with increasing skepticism, often considering it speculative and devoid of any meaningful or empirical content. This view became dominant, dismissing traditional metaphysical questions as pseudo-questions, i.e., devoid of empirical content and therefore devoid of real meaning. However, this trend began to shift with the influence of figures such as W. Quine, who played a key role in revitalizing metaphysics within the analytic tradition, and is often considered the founder of the new “analytic metaphysics.” Notably, his challenge to the then analytic-synthetic distinction in his famous paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” had profound implications for logical positivism and the verification principle. Quine argued that there was no clear boundary between purely analytic propositions (known through understanding alone) and synthetic propositions (known through experience), thus breaking the dogmatic boundaries between conceptual analysis and empirical representation. This perspective opened the possibility of reappreciating ontological questions that had until then been marginalized.
This resurgence of metaphysical thought was further propelled in three successive phases. Initially, scientific realism and naturalism as metaphysical themes were rehabilitated by thinkers such as G. H. von Wright and Arthur Prior. In a second phase, the topic of universals, abstract objects, and essences were reinserted into analytic discourse by D. Lewis and D. M. Armstrong. In a third phase, M. Loux and particularly S. Kripke added new dimensions to analytic metaphysics with their theories on “rigid names” and on modal logic and semantics. These contributions significantly shaped the development of analytic metaphysics, particularly in terms of the nature of reference, identity, and modality. These advances, which extended from the 1960s to the present day, mark a significant period in the history of analytic philosophy where metaphysical explorations, previously considered obsolete, gain new vitality and relevance.
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Contents |
Ricardo Barroso Batista and Bruno Nobre, “Explorations in Contemporary Analytic Metaphysics: Grounding, Modality, and the Nature of Reality,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 741–50, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_0741.
Thomas Hofweber, “Fundamental Ontology and Esoteric Metaphysics: How to Settle the Question,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 753–82, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_0753.
Niccolò Covoni, Alberto Corti, and Vincenzo Fano, “A Model-Based Form of Naturalised Metaphysics,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 783–818, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_0783.
Andrea Strollo, “The Logical Rise of Analytic Metaphysics,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 819–40, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_0819.
Ricardo Barroso Batista, “O Problema da Representação na Metafísica Analítica: Analisando a Falácia Representacional no debate sobre o Tempo,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 841–82, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_0841.
Benjamin Curtis and Harold Noonan, “Scepticism About Neo-Aristotelian Essences,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 885–904, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_0885.
Joshua Spencer, “Rethinking Grounding: From Necessitation to Metaphysical Probability,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 905–24, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_0905.
Joshua R. Sijuwade, “Grounding and Inference to the Best Explanation: A Novel Argument for Theism,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 925–70, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_0925.
Cristina Nencha, “Why Contextualist Approaches to Essences Are Worth Pursuing,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 971–94, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_0971.
Uwe Meixner, “A Modal Argument for Determinism Qua Universal Necessity,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 997–1008, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_0997.
Daniel Saudek, “Temporal and Atemporal Asymmetries in Causation,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 1009–40, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_1009.
Tomasz Bigaj, “Symmetry-Breaking Indeterminism as a Challenge to Generalism,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 1041–56, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_1041.
A.R.J. Fisher, “David Lewis on Ways Things Might Be: An Examination of Modal Realism through Lewis’s Correspondence,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 1059–80, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_1059.
Christopher Hughes, “Lewis on Existence and Actual Existence,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 1081–1122, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_1081.
Tomasz Kąkol, “Two Problems of Ontology of States of Affairs: Negative States of Affairs and the Slingshot Argument,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 1123–32, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_1123.
Jan Hauska, “Dispositional Harmony: Examining the Causal Connection Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 1135–44, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_1135.
Bo Mou, “The Same Objects, Self-Identities, Existential Bases,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 1145–86, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_1145.
Ruoyu Zhang, “The Category Mistake of Locating Properties in Spacetime and Platonic Immanence,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 1187–1214, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_1187.
Francesco Maria Ferrari, “Some Notes on the Role of the Identity of Indiscernibles in Metaphysics,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 1215–42, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_1215.
Concha García González, “Book Review - Hernández Royo, Simón. Anarkía/Anarcolepsis. Ensayo-Filosofía. Madrid: Editorial Manuscritos, 2024.,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 1245–48, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_1245.
Ricardo Barroso Batista, “Book Review - Poslajko, Krzysztof. Unreal Beliefs. An Anti-Realist Approach in the Metaphysics of Mind. Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2024.,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 1249–56, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_1249.
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