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David Lewis on Ways Things Might Be: An Examination of Modal Realism through Lewis’s Correspondence

David Lewis on Ways Things Might Be: An Examination of Modal Realism through Lewis’s Correspondence

A.R.J. Fisher, “David Lewis on Ways Things Might Be: An Examination of Modal Realism through Lewis’s Correspondence,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 1059–80, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_1059.

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  • David Lewis on Ways Things Might Be: An Examination of Modal Realism through Lewis’s Correspondence

    Item Type Journal Article
    Author A.R.J. Fisher
    Abstract David Lewis is widely known for maintaining the bizarre thesis known as genuine modal realism (hereafter, modal realism). He argued for modal realism on grounds of serviceability in On the Plurality of Worlds. However, earlier in Counterfactuals, he proposed a different kind of argument: from talk of ways things might be to possible worlds. In this paper, I examine the evolution of the latter argument in Lewis’s thought and evaluate its place in his overall case for modal realism, especially in light of the alternative theory of modality known as magical ersatzism. I argue that Lewis turns the argument on its head in his critique of magical ersatzism, but that his later commitment to Ramseyan humility subjects him to a similar criticism. Therefore, the argument is, ultimately, a poisoned pawn for Lewis.
    Date 2024
    Language English
    Rights © 2024 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural
    Volume 80
    Pages 1059-1080
    Publication Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
    DOI 10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_1059
    Issue 4
    Date Added 12/6/2024, 8:33:03 PM
    Modified 12/6/2024, 10:19:09 PM

    Tags:

    • magical ersatzism, metaphysics of modality, modal realism, possible worlds, ramseyan humility.

    Notes:

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