Benjamin Hole, “Aristotle’s Account of Moral Perception (EN.VI.8) & Nussbaum’s Priority of the Particular Thesis,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 77, no. 1 (2021): 357–80, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2021_77_1_0357.
| Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Benjamin Hole |
| Rights | © 2021 by Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| Volume | 77 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 357-380 |
| Publication | Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia |
| ISSN | 0870-5283 |
| Date | 2021 |
| DOI | 10.17990/RPF/2021_77_1_0357 |
| Language | English |
| Abstract | Consider a contemporary retrieval of Aristotle’s account of moral perception. Drawing from EN.VI.8, Martha Nussbaum argues that we perceive moral particulars prior to ethical principles. First, I explain her priority of the particular thesis. The virtuous person perceives value in the world, as part of her moral deliberation. This perceptual skill is an important aspect of her virtuous activity, and hence also part of her eudaimonia. Second, I present her priority thesis with a dilemma: our perception of moral particulars is either non-inferential or it is inferential. If Nussbaum accepts a non-inferential interpretation, then she is committed to an unsavory view about moral epistemology –one that invites intuitionism and relativism. But if she accepts a non-inferential account, then the moral particular is no longer prior to the ethical principle. I suggest that her better option is to grab the second horn. This move avoids the problems of the first horn without sacrificing her neo-Aristotelian commitments or her overarching view that the perception of moral particulars is ineliminable to moral deliberation (and eudaimonia). At the same time, this move renders her priority thesis trivial. |
| Date Added | 4/29/2021, 12:33:25 AM |
| Modified | 4/29/2021, 11:53:15 AM |
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