This book examines the question of the intelligibility of reality from the distinctive perspective of Émile Meyerson’s philosophy. Meyerson’s work is centred on the problem of knowledge in general and, more specifically, on scientific knowledge, which he approached through what he called a “philosophy of the intellect”. Although he sought to avoid explicit metaphysical commitments, his analysis of scientific thought inevitably raises fundamental critical and metaphysical questions concerning the nature of reality, the structure of reason, and the limits of human understanding.
For Meyerson, the intelligibility of reality lies in the extent to which the real can satisfy the a priori demands of the intellect, above all the demand for identity. To know is, in a profound sense, to identify: to reduce diversity, change, and succession to unity, permanence, and sameness. This tendency is present not only in scientific explanation but also in ordinary thought. The book therefore explores how Meyerson derives his thesis of the partial intelligibility of the real from his analysis of both common sense and scientific reason.
The study begins by presenting Meyerson’s life, intellectual formation, method, and philosophical programme. It then examines the central elements of his “philosophy of the intellect”, including his conception of reason, the possible a priori content of thought, the antinomic character of intellectual activity, and the role of the principle-tendency of identity. Particular attention is given to the way in which Meyerson’s thought, though shaped by the empiricist and positivist climate of his early formation, also reveals the influence of major rationalist philosophers such as Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant.
The central chapters investigate the properly philosophical problem of the intelligibility of the real. They analyse how Meyerson identifies, within scientific laws and explanatory science, the intellect’s persistent effort to discover identity beneath the diversity of phenomena. Scientific explanation, in this sense, is not satisfied with the mere formulation of laws; it seeks causes, unities, and identities. Yet this rational impulse encounters resistance. Reality does not fully yield to the intellect’s demand for identity. There remains within it an irreducible element that cannot be completely explained or rationalised.
The book thus shows how Meyerson arrives at his decisive conclusion: reality is only partially intelligible. The limits encountered by reason are not merely provisional or factual; they are intrinsic limits imposed by reality itself. Meyerson designates these limits as the “irrational”, not in the sense of absurdity, but as that which resists complete reduction to identity and full rational explanation.
In its final part, the study places Meyerson’s position within a broader history of philosophical reflection on the intelligibility of reality and draws together the main conclusions of the investigation. The result is a comprehensive analysis of Meyerson’s thought, showing both the power and the limits of reason in its attempt to understand the real.