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An Actionist Approach to the Justificational Role of Perceptual Experience

An Actionist Approach to the Justificational Role of Perceptual Experience

Eros Moreira de Carvalho, “An Actionist Approach to the Justificational Role of Perceptual Experience,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 72, no. 2–3 (2016): 545–72, DOI 10.17990/RPF/2016_72_2_0545.

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  • An Actionist Approach to the Justificational Role of Perceptual Experience

    Type Journal Article
    Author Eros Moreira de Carvalho
    Rights © 2016 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural | © 2016 Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
    Volume 72
    Issue 2-3
    Pages 545-572
    Publication Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
    ISSN 0870-5283; 2183-461X
    Date 2016
    DOI 10.17990/RPF/2016_72_2_0545
    Language English
    Abstract In this paper, I defend an account of how perceptual experience can bear rational relation to our empirical thought. In the first part, I elaborate two claims that are central for the justificational role of perceptual experience, namely, the claim that perception and belief share the same kind of content, and the claim that perception is independent from belief. At first sight, these claims seems not to be compatible, since the first one seems to require the truth of content conceptualism, while the second one seems to require its falsity. In the second part, based on Alva Noë’s actionist theory of perception, I argue in favor of a less intellectualist interpretation of the first claim, uncommitted to content conceptualism, and then I show how it can be reconciled with the second claim. Finally, I explain how perception holds rational relationships with our empirical thought through the exercise of observational concepts. These concepts link what I propose to call ‘space of actions’ to the logical space of reasons.
    Date Added 19/10/2016, 12:26:47
    Modified 25/10/2016, 10:14:53


    • Alva Noë,
    • cognitive penetrability,
    • conceptualism,
    • internalism,
    • perceptual justification,
    • sensorimotor theories of perception


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