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The Category Mistake of Locating Properties in Spacetime and Platonic Immanence

The Category Mistake of Locating Properties in Spacetime and Platonic Immanence

Ruoyu Zhang, “The Category Mistake of Locating Properties in Spacetime and Platonic Immanence,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (2024): 1187–1214, https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_1187.

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  • The Category Mistake of Locating Properties in Spacetime and Platonic Immanence

    Item Type Journal Article
    Author Ruoyu Zhang
    Abstract This paper challenges the traditional metaphysical assumption that properties can be located in spacetime and examines the ontological implications of categorizing spacetime itself. By introducing a two-category ontology, we argue that attempts to locate properties in spacetime represent a category mistake, as this notion fails to address the fundamental categorization of spacetime. We propose that the notion of instantiation should be conceptually separated from spatiotemporal location, thereby allowing for properties that are Platonic yet immanent. Furthermore, we reevaluate the debate between Platonism and Aristotelianism, advocating that Platonic properties can possess a form of immanence previously thought to be exclusive to Aristotelian frameworks. This reformation not only underscores the need for categorizing spacetime but also reshapes our understanding of the instantiation and immanence of properties within ontological dependence frameworks.
    Date 2024
    Language English
    Rights © 2024 Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural
    Volume 80
    Pages 1187-1214
    Publication Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
    DOI 10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_1187
    Issue 4
    Date Added 12/6/2024, 8:33:09 PM
    Modified 12/6/2024, 10:25:46 PM

    Tags:

    • aristotelianism, category mistake, immanence, instantiation, platonism, spacetime.

    Notes:

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